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Abstract—Secure chips are in permanent risk of attacks.
Physical attacks usually start removing part of the package and
accessing the dice by different means: laser shots, electrical or
electromagnetic probes, etc. Doing this from the backside of
the chip gives some advantages since no metal layers interfere
between the hacker and the signals of interest. The bulk silicon is
thinned from hundreds to some tens of micrometers in order to
improve the performance of the attack. In this paper a backside
polishing detector is presented that is sensitive to the thickness
of the bulk silicon existing below the transistors, a numerical
signature is generated which is related to this. The detector
implements built-in self-surveillance techniques which protect it
from being tampered.
Index Terms—Attack Detector, Security, TSV, Phase Detector,
Built-in Self Surveillance.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the world of security the protection of sensitive infor-
mation is the cornerstone. In this objective, smart-cards and
other specialized products embedded in integrated circuits play
a key-role [1].
Integrated circuit technologies provide an implicit physical
protection that motivated since late 90s their expansion as
robust solutions for security products now. For example, at
present nobody discusses the use of smart-cards in electronic
payment [2]. Similarly, the new evolution of electronic pay-
ment with smart-phones involve the additions of cryptographic
chips inside [3]. Alongside with this, the hacking technologies
have also evolved. Very early, during development of space
technologies in the 70s, it was discovered means to test failures
in chips induced by particles in vacuum space [4]. Since this
beginning now, these technologies have evolved as powerful
tools available for hackers too.
One of the common attacks is the shot of laser beams onto
chip [5]. The basic principle consists on the creation of free
charges in the transistors and as a consequence to alter the
right operation of the circuit. Depending on the case: light
color, energy level and focus are tuned to improve the success
of the attack. However, on the one hand circuit designers have
learned how to mask the active parts against these shots and on
the other hand the increase of metal layers in ICs have limited
the success of this attack. One alternative to extend the power
of laser attacks has been to direct the shots from the backside
of the chip [6]. This approach has the advantage to circumvent
all metals of the circuit allowing to reach transistors through
the bulk glass. Nevertheless, the thickness is large, around
300 µm compared to the front thickness of 15 µm, and thus the
laser has to use long wave lengths which limit its effectiveness.
This inconvenient could be solved by thinning the backside of
the wafer.
Another powerful tool is the optical imaging of the residual
photon emission of transistors [7], [8]. In their saturation state,
a low intensity photon emission in the band of infrared takes
place. This allows mapping the activity of the circuit and
locating sensitive parts of secure blocks. This tool does not
allow conducting a full attack over a chip but it provides
crucial information for the next steps of it. Images are captured
from the backside of the chip but the large thickness absorbs
most of the photons and thus it is thinned to increase the
amount of signal arriving to the camera. Either in the works
of [7] and [8] the chip is thinned to 20 µm and to 50 µm
respectively.
The boldest backside attack is presented by Helfmeier in [9].
His objective is to remove individual transistors responsible
of control signals, vital for the security. This operation has
high risks and cannot be done from the front size of the chip
unless the integrity of the chip is threatened. The approach
is performed in several steps. First the entire chip is polished
from 300 to 30 µm. Then, with a FIB machine, a trench is
opened covering the area surrounding the targeted transistor.
Finally, the transistor is precisely located and it is removed
with the same FIB beam.
The reduction of chip thickness is used in standard chip
production too. For example, in chip cards it is necessary to
comply with card’s dimensions. However, as formerly explain
it may represent a direct via to access at important elements
of the chip, despite the technology sophistication needed is
high. One way to tackle with this problem would be to know
how much bulk material does have the chip once it becomes
active during production test.
In this paper a detector that reacts to the thickness of the
bulk material is presented. Its core elements are TSVs [10].
TSVs are the present 3D technology massively used to stack
chips, specially multifunction like CPUs and cache memories.
Columns of conductive material pass through the silicon mov-
ing signals from the active side of the chip to the back-side.
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Fig. 1. Main steps of the TSV fabrication process: 1) etching, 2) oxidizing,
3) filling with conductive material and 4) wafer thinning.
They can be fabricated following patterns and, despite they are
still expensive, their year production is increasing significantly
and therefore their cost is being reduced progressively [11].
Many companies are currently using this technology for the
integration of tiers. TSVs can be built before or after the
fabrication of the devices and routing layers. Their creation
follow these basic steps, see Fig. 1: 1) etching step to drill the
holes, 2) oxide deposition to isolate the walls of the column
from the substrate, 3) filling of the holes with conductive
material (usually poly-silicon or cupper) and 4) thinning of the
wafer because TSVs are initially blind and in this last step the
tips are opened and made accessible. Presently, manufacturers
can fabricate TSVs with the dimension ranges from 5−10 µm
of radius and 50− 300 µm of height.
The rest of the paper is distributed as follows. In Section II
the principle of the Backside Polishing Detector (BPD) is
presented. Next, in Section III the active part of the BPD is
explained, the delta meter. Following, the model for the BPD
is developed in Section IV and in Section V the results are
presented. Finally, in Section VI conclusions are discussed.
II. PRINCIPLE OF THE BACKSIDE POLISHING DETECTOR
As explained in the introduction, the core elements of the
Backside Polishing Detector (BDP) are Through Silicon Vias
(TSV). For our detector we exploit the parasitic capacitance
effect that these structures have with the bulk silicon. Consid-
ering the thicknesses of the oxide, between 0.1− 0.3 µm the
parasitic capacitances can range from 50 fF to 150 fF.
Different models have been proposed to model the electrical
behavior of TSVs, [12]. Basically, they depend on the oper-
ating frequency and that for GHz they include the inductive,
resistive and capacitive parasitic components. In our case, the
BPD is designed to work at very low frequencies, in the
range of MHz. As it is explained in [12], at these frequencies
the only significant parasitic effect is the capacitive so we
have assumed to work with a lumped model consisting of a
capacitance connected to ground.
Let’s consider the case for a single TSV shown in Fig. 2. A
hacker polishes the wafer in order to get closer to the active
region of the chip. At different degrees of polishing the value
of the parasitic capacitance would become reduced close to a
linear trend with the depth of the bulk material removed.
Owing to the cylindrical geometry we can approximate the
parasitic capacitance as follows,
Ct = cc · x+ Cb ≈ cc · x (1)
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Fig. 2. TSVs present a parasitic capacitance that is proportional to the
thickness of the bulk silicon.
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Fig. 3. Principle of the BPD.
where cc is the unit length capacitance of the cylinder walls,
x is the depth and Cb is the capacitance of the base that can
be neglected, for its small contribution to the total parasitics
and because is the first part to be wiped out during the attack.
In the next section, a circuit is presented that uses this
parasitic effect to generate a signature for the depth of the
bulk.
III. BPD’S DELTA METER
Imagine that a structure consisting of two sets of TSVs is
built. Set t1 have a capacitance of Ct1 = cc · x and set t2 a
capacitance of Ct2 = (1+u)cc ·x, where u is the unbalancing
ratio. These sets will present a capacitance difference equal to
CN = (Ct2−Ct1) = u ·cc ·x. In Fig. 3 an example of two sets
with capacitances Ct2 = 2Ct1 is shown, the unbalancing ratio
is then u = 1. A delta meter is designed such that it measures
the capacitance difference and outputs a digital signature N
proportional to this.
This difference is used to prevent a simple tampering tactic
consisting of adding a metalization on the backside of the
chip in order to compensate the amount of capacitance lost
during the grinding. Owing to these two sets this tampering
becomes less trivial, furthermore the geometry of the sets can
be planned special such that it makes this tampering even
uneasier.
A. Delta Meter
Delta meter is the circuit that implements the transformation
N = f(CN ), i.e. it generates a digital signature that is
a function of the capacitance difference CN . The circuit is
designed following two main objectives: 1) to be as linear as
possible and 2) to have a strong resilience to tampering.
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Fig. 4. Schematic of the delta meter.
In Fig. 4 the schematic of the delta meter is shown. It
is composed by to modules (A) and (B). Module (A) is a
ring oscillator that excites simultaneous oscillations in the two
TSV sets, represented here by the two capacitors Ct1 and
Ct2. Module (B) is a phase detector that measures the delay
difference of the signals coming from set t1 and set t2 lines
and generates the digital signature N . The operation of these
two modules is explained hereafter.
1) Module A: It is the core of the detector. It has two
different parts: the single line part whose total delay is D
and a split part that contains the set t1 line with a total delay
of dt1 and the set t2 line with a total delay of dt2. When
the start of check input is ON, the loop of the ring is closed
and the oscillation starts. The signal coming from D switches
simultaneously the lines controling TSVs in set t1 and set t2.
The transitions coming from D split through both lines and
due to the difference in the parasitic capacitances of the two
sets, u · cc, the transition in set t2 will arrive later than in
set t1, i.e. dt2 > dt1. Once the transitions cross the output
inverters and arrive to the OR gate, they will be combined
in the following way: if they are rising, the one coming from
the set t1 line (the fastest) will trigger the output of the OR,
otherwise if they are falling transitions, the one coming from
the set t2 line (the slowest) will trigger the output of the OR
gate.
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Fig. 5. The phase detector generates a voltage drop in the tank capacitor CP
that is proportional to the time delay existing between set t1 and set t2 lines.
According to this, the period of the ring oscillation is,
t = 2D + dt1 + dt2 (2)
The parameters of the ring, i.e. delay D and buffers strength,
must be dimensioned to make the signal switching to happen
in the full voltage range. Otherwise, the linearity of the delta
meter would become distorted.
2) Module B: Module B of Fig. 4 is the phase detector.
Before starting, the start of check signal is at OFF and it
closes the pmos transistor which will charge capacitor CP
at a maximum voltage VDD and will also reset the counter to
N = (0...0)2. The rest of the elements are the current source
IP whose purpose is to discharge capacitor CP at a constant
current ratio when the nmos transistor is closed, the current
source Ileak which models the leakage discharge of capacitor
CP and the inverter connected to the enabling signal of the
counter, whose purpose is to stop the counter when the voltage
level of the capacitor decreases below its threshold level.
When the start of check signal is set to ON, the pmos
transitor opens and the capacitor is let to store the charge.
At the same time, the ring starts oscillating and provides the
clock signal to the counter which starts increasing its value N
at the speed of the oscillation. Owing to the delay difference
between dt1 and dt2 the XOR gate starts producing two pulses
per period, as illustrated in Fig. 5. Once the voltage in the
capacitor has decreased below the threshold of the inverter,
the counter stops and stores the final value N which will be
correlated to the total discharge of the capacitor and thus to
the delay between the set t1 and set t2 lines.
In the next section the model of the delta meter is developed
to justify its approximate linear behavior with respect to x.
IV. MODEL OF THE DELTA METER
Following the principle illustrated in Fig. 5 the number of
ring periods registered in the counter can be estimated as,
N = (1− ht) CPVDD
2IP (dt2 − dt1) + Ileaktmin (3)
where CPVDD is the total charge stored in the tank capacitor,
2ID(dt2 − dt1) is the amount of charge drained in each
period, Ileaktmin is the leakage charge flowing per period
and ht is the normalized threshold level of the inverter gate
(counter enabling), that senses the voltage at the tank capacitor.
The leakage term would be important in case that the delay
difference (dt2 − dt1) would approach to zero, situation in
which most of the bulk material would be removed and the
parasitic capacitances of the TSVs would be the minimum
possible. In this case the period of the ring oscillator would
be the minimum possible, tmin, too.
A. Modeling the Delay
For the modeling of the delay we assume the α-power model
for the transistors [13]. Using the approximation in [14] the
delay is modeled as,
d = k˜
CVDD
(VDD − Vt)α (4)
where α is the velocity saturation coefficient of the carriers,
Vt the threshold voltage of the transistors, k˜ is a trans-
resistance which includes the rest of transistor parameters
and C the parasitic capacitance in which the line propagates.
All technological parameters are balanced between nmos and
pmos transistors. Expression (4) approximates well if the
signal swing is in the full voltage range and if the line is
short enough so that no effects of transmission lines manifest.
These conditions must be considered during the design of the
BPD.
Using (4) the delay difference is calculated as,
(dt2 − dt1) = k˜ VDD
(VDD − Vt)α (Ct2 − Ct1) =
= k˜
VDD
(VDD − Vt)αCN = k˜
VDD
(VDD − Vt)αu · cc · x
(5)
Combining (5) in (3) we have the following,
N = (1− ht) CPVDD
Ileaktmin
·
1
1 +
2IP k˜
Ileaktmin
VDD
(VDD − Vt)αu · cc · x
(6)
If we use the first order approximation (1 + x)−1 ≈ (1 − x)
of the Taylor’s series we get,
N ≈ (1− ht) CPVDD
Ileaktmin
·(
1− 2IP k˜
Ileaktmin
VDD
(VDD − Vt)αu · cc · x
) (7)
In this expression the term Ileaktmin is the most sensitive to
process variations. In order to minimize its effect, a minimum
charge is drained per period of the ring oscillator and made
independent of the TSVs lines, such that this leakage becomes
Ileaktmin+Qmin ≈ Qmin. Therefore, the final expression of
the delta meter is,
N =Nmax
(
1− K˜ · u · x
)
Nmax = (1− ht)CPVDD
Qmin
K˜ =
2IP k˜
Qmin
VDD
(VDD − Vt)α · cc
(8)
The parameter Nmax is the maximum counting that the
detector can reach in case that a hacker would polish all the
bulk silicon. The product K˜ · u is the conversion factor from
thickness to the decimal fraction of the counted periods. In
normal conditions these are subtracted from the maximum
such that the counter will give an intermediate value (pass
response), that can be tuned using the unbalancing ratio u of
the TSV sets t1 and t2.
V. RESULTS
TABLE I
RESPONSE OF THE BPD TO DIFFERENT KIND OF ATTACKS.
Attack Thickness Oscillator Signature
[µm] frequency [MHz] N
min : typ : max min : typ : max
0 250 87 : 70 : 57 77 : 91 : 105
1 200 90 : 72 : 59 98 : 112 : 126
2 150 93 : 74 : 61 133 : 147 : 168
3 100 96 : 77 : 63 217 : 252 : 273
4 50 100 : 80 : 65 322 : 343 : 357
5 25 102 : 81 : 66 371 : 392 : 413
6 0 103 : 83 : 67 427 : 441 : 462
A BPD has been implemented in a 65 nm technology
from ST-microelectronics. The two TSV sets have a nominal
capacitance of Ct1 = 250 fF and an unbalancing ratio of
u = 0.5, being the largest capacitance Ct2 = 375 fF. The
maximum bulk depth of the simulated integrated circuit is
250 µm giving a ratio of cc = 1 µFm−1.
The simulated attack produces 7 different thicknesses and
in each of them the BPD is run to obtain the signature N . In
Table I the results are shown for the typical and the corner
cases. These values are also plotted in Fig. 6.
The pass region is Npass = [77, 105] that owing
to the global variability it produces a escape region of
[187 µm, 250 µm] and thus the thickness of the bulk silicon
is protected from 187 µm down to 0.
We have also considered possible tampering actions. The
hacker polishes the bulk of the chip down to 15 µm, point
at which he can use a FIB for local editing. To cheat the
detector he contacts one or the other TSV sets with a micro-
probe following the objective to reinforce the capacitance
unbalance and reach back the pass region. Assuming a 20 fF
parasitic capacitance, the two signatures obtained are shown
in red crosses (Tamper 1) and (Tamper 2) in Fig. 6. The
tampering doesn’t succeed since the signatures still stay far
from the pass region. We could also think of the use of
heavier micro-probes to additionally decrease signatures. This
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Fig. 7. Fitting of the linear approximation, error and BPD characteristic depth.
case of tunning presents much difficulties, but as a precaution
the detector must be designed such that pass region is in the
approximately middle range of the counting, above the point
when the response bends. As a design criteria we propose to
use the characteristic depth as is explained below.
In Fig. 7 the fitting of equation (8) with typical values
is shown. From the adjustment the extracted parameters are:
Nmax = 441, K˜ = 8888.9 µm−1, being u = 0.5 by design.
The error between the linear model and the simulated values is
printed at the right axis. Notice that below 150 µm the error
is negligible but above this depth it increases very quickly,
tending to a linear growth with the depth.
We call characteristic depth L∗ of BPD to the depth at
which the error starts increasing, for our case this happens
at approximately L∗ = 150 µm. Notice that above this value
the sensitivity of the BPD decreases quickly and therefore it
doesn’t make sense to extend the depth of the TSVs beyond
this value. Therefore, for this detector we would use TSVs of
a maximum depth of 150 µm.
BPD is aimed to be used as a single unit per chip. Therefore
the estimation of the area overhead presented in Table II
TABLE II
ESTIMATED AREA OVERHEAD FOR CURRENT MANUFACTURED DIES.
Type of circuit Area Overhead
BPD u = 0.5
5 TSVs (10 um) + delta meter
471 um2
DRAM and Flash Production Product Generations
29 mm2 16.25 ppm
MPU (High-volume microprocessors)
88 mm2 5.35 ppm
High-performance MPU
164 mm2 2.87 ppm
ASIC Product Generations
858 mm2 0.55 ppm
assumes the impact of the detector area with respect to the
areas of the present manufactured dies. For the BPD we
assume that it works with an unbalancing ratio u = 0.5. This
means that it needs 5 TSVs columns separated as 2 for set t1
and 3 for set t2. We suppose a diameter for the TSVs of 10 um
and additional area equivalent to a TSV for the delta meter,
giving a total area of 471 um2 for a technology of 65 nm.
As present die areas we have considered the data in the
ITRS predictions for year 2015 in four different cases, [15].
As it can be observed in Table II the maximum area overhead
is 16.25 ppm for DRAM and Flash Production Product
Generations, which represents a very small impact.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper a Backside Polishing Detector has been pre-
sented. The objective is to detect the amount of material that
is removed from the bulk of a chip. The detector generates
a signature that is proportional to thickness of the chip. Its
operation is fully autonomous and it only has a start signal to
run the operation. Once it finishes it activates a stop signal and
provides the signature in the output of a counter. In a clean
chip the signature will be a number around the half run of the
counter (pass margin) while in a tampered circuit the signature
will provide a number far out of this pass margin. The BPD
is robust in the sense that actions trying to cheat its operation
will unbalance the signature forcing a higher or lower value
away from the pass margin.
Results in a simulated BPD have been reported for the
typical and the corner cases. They show the stability of the
detector under process variations. Also, different tampering
actions have been considered and the signature response has
been shown resilient against them.
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